This paper presents a model that is directed at rationalizing several aspects of charitable giving. First, individuals do not appear to reduce their contributions to a charity significantly when they learn that the government or other individuals have increased the funds that they devote to the charity's beneficiaries. Indeed, there are instances in which people increase their contributions when they hear that others have contributed more. Second, there are often several distinct charities that contribute to the same beneficiaries, and these charities frequently differ by the donor population to whom they target their appeal. Related to this, one sometimes observes increases in the number charitable organizations without a corresponding increase in the contributions relative to income. Lastly, the extent to which individuals contribute to charity differs greatly, even among countries that appear otherwise quite similar.
These observations can be rationalized by supposing that people have social preferences with the properties assumed in Rotemberg (2009) . These preferences are based on two human tendencies detected in the empirical psychology literature. The first is that people are happier when they learn that there is more agreement with their point of view. The second is that they have warmer feelings towards, and are more willing to help, individuals whom they perceive as sharing their beliefs or, more generally, individuals who are more similar to themselves. Rotemberg (2009) captures these properties in a utility function and shows that, in combination, they can explain why people vote.
Charitable contributions are similar to voting in that they allow people to signal what they like. People who think a particular charitable cause is worthwhile can signal this attitude to others by contributing, just like voting for a candidate can signal the belief that a candidate is suitable for office. The parallel is in some ways even closer in the sense that both charitable contributions and voting involve the expression of beliefs about how resources ought to be distributed to others. These beliefs are often held quite passionately and it may be particularly important for people to find ways to make other people who share these beliefs feel good about themselves. In the current context, it should lead people who believe in a charitable cause to gain (vicarious) utility from contributing to this cause because they 1 would expect the happiness of other believers to rise when they learn that there are more people like them.
Consistent with Andreoni (1990) , whose model also rationalizes the observation that government contributions "crowd-out" private donations only modestly, my results hinge on the supposition that individual utility does not depend only on the public good that is provided by the charity. The extra utility of giving (or "warm glow" to use Andreoni's (1990) phrase) is modeled explicitly as depending on the utility received by others, however.
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The size of this particular benefit from contributions depends on an individual's assessment of the number of people who agree with him. If an individual perceives this number to be larger, he expects more people to gain from learning that an additional person agrees with them, and his own vicarious benefits from donating rise. This fits broadly with the empirical evidence suggesting that, all else equal, people are more likely to contribute to a cause if they expect the cause to have many other supporters.
Democratic voting systems give one vote to each person regardless of income. Charitable contributions, on the other hand, do vary by income. If preferences do not vary by income, the standard public goods model of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) predicts this only too well. Indeed, it predicts that all contributors have the same marginal utility of (and level) of private consumption, with the rest of income being contributed to charity. On the other hand, List (2011) shows that, in the U.S, low income donors typically contribute at least as high a proportion of their income to charity as higher income donors.
In my model, higher income individuals have a related reason to contribute more, namely that their income makes them willing to pay a higher price to signal that there is an additional altruist around. One novel implication of the model, on the other hand, is that the contributions of poorer individuals tend to be subject to multiple equilibria. Equilibria where poor individuals do not contribute at all tend to coexist with equilibria in which their donations constitute the bulk of total contributions. The intuition for this multiplicity is Individuals may be able to remember their own contributions, so this still leaves the possibility that they are signaling to their future selves as in Bénabou and Tirole (2006) .
In their model, individuals value this because they would like to believe themselves to be generous. This still leaves open the question of what form of "genuine generosity" it is that people would like to believe themselves to be in possession of. The model in this paper is an attempt at answering this question.
Because it would be attractive to model genuine generosity in a manner that is consistent with people's behavior and attitudes in other domains, I focus on the two psychological forces mentioned at the start. 5 The first is people's tendency to be more helpful to people that are more similar to them. There are two types of evidence for this. First, there is the cross-sectional positive correlation between similarity and the extent to which people are close in social networks, and thus tend to help each other. This correlation has been called homophily and an extensive literature on it is surveyed by McPherson et al. (2001) . Second, a variety of experiments have sought to vary the extent to which subjects help by changing the extent to which subjects perceive the target of their helping as similar to themselves.
Recent experiments showing that perceived similarity raises helping include Stürmer et al. (2006) and Valdesolo and DeSteno (2011) .
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My analysis is also based on the idea that people's utility increases when they think that others agree with them or, in the terminology of Gaillot and Baumeister (2007) , when they view others as validating their worldview. Gaillot and Baumeister (2007) provide crosssectional evidence consistent with this: people's self-esteem appears positively correlated with the extent to which they say that others agree with them. 7 There is also some experimental evidence showing that attempts at changing people's perception of how much others 5 Earlier evidence for these tendencies is discussed in Rotemberg (2009) . 6 While not involving helping per se, the experiments in Walton et al. (2011) are notable because a very minimal manipulation of similarity (being mentioned as belonging to a "group") leads to increased effort in a task that fits with the group's name.
7 People do not give identical responses when they are asked how satisfied they are with themselves than when they are asked how satisfied they are with life as a whole, where the latter is more often used as a stand-in for happiness. Still the two responses are highly correlated. Indeed. Diener and Diener (1995) show that life satisfaction is more correlated with this measure of self-esteem than with the other measures of domain-specific satisfaction they consider.
agree with them affect their reported self-esteem. See, in particular, the studies in Pool et al. (1998) and Kenworthy and Miller (2001) . Pool et al. (1998) shows that the extent to which the opinions held by a group affects an individual's self-esteem depends on the nature of the group, with people caring more about groups that are more similar to themselves. By the same token, individuals's helpfulness appears to depend on similarity along a wide variety of dimensions.
8 This suggests that, while donors to a charity care about other donors, the extent to which they care about a particular group of donors depends on the extent to which this group is similar to them in other ways. This leads me to analyze whether differentiated charities arise in equilibrium, where these charities provide funds to the same beneficiaries but specialize in collecting funds from distinct groups. As an example of this, many churches conduct their own fundraisers for popular causes. Also, disasters tend to generate fundraising activities by a variety of organizations, at least some of which cater to relatively narrow clienteles. Nonetheless, a model that allows the number of differentiated charities to grow without leading to growth in contributions might be valuable in interpreting these trends.
10
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes the public goods approach to charity, not only to recapitulate the weaknesses stressed by Sugden (1982) and Andreoni (1988) but also to lay the foundations for the behavioral assumptions added in Section 2.
With these assumptions, government spending causes a smaller crowding out than in the public goods case. Moreover, people may respond to news of more contributions by increasing their own donations. Section 3 starts the analysis of the case where people also belong to one of two groups that differ in other ways. Section 4 presents equilibria in which the two groups contribute to distinct charities. The following section studies the inference problem faced by individuals when there is only one set of indistinguishable charities while section 6 presents the resulting equilibria. Section 7 compares outcomes with indistinguishable charities to outcomes where these cater to different types of donors. Section 8 concludes.
Background: The standard public goods case
There are N individuals, of which m of belong to a subset A and sympathize with the beneficiaries of a charity. The rest are selfish. All individuals have pre-tax income I, pay 10 In tackling the question of what determines the equilibrium number of charities, this paper is related to Bilodeau and Slivinski (1997) , Rose-Ackerman (1982) and Aldashev and Verdier (2010) . None of these papers focuses on forces that can potentially increase the number of charities without raising charitable contributions, however. 6 taxes t and can spend their after-tax income on either privately consumed goods or on charity. Individual i's expenditures on the former are denoted by x i while those on the latter are denoted by g i . Individual i's budget constraint is thus
The taxes t are used to support the charity's beneficiaries, so the total funds received by these beneficiaries equals
where the second equality serves to define G −i , the amount received by the beneficiaries from all sources other than i's voluntary contributions.
The utility function of selfish individuals just depends on their private consumption so that they set x i = I − t. Altruists, on the other hand, have payoffs that depend on the welfare of the beneficiaries so that, as in the standard public goods analysis of charitable contributions of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) , their utility depends on G. For simplicity, I consider a particular functional form that relates the "material payoffs" P i to
x i and G, namely
Preferences with this functional form have been used before in the literature, particularly by Andreoni (1990) . Using (1) and (2), these payoffs can be written as
The first order condition for maximizing P i with strictly positive g i is
which gives
7 Consider a symmetric equilibrium in which people all know G −i and set g i optimally. At this equilibrium, all g i must equal a common value g so that G equals (gm + tN ). Using the first order condition (5), this symmetric equilibrium satisfies
Total private giving to charity equals mg so that, using (7), the total received by the charity's recipients equals
When m = N so that everyone is an altruist, an increase in t has no effect on G. This is Warr's (1982) neutrality result and follows from the ability of altruistic individuals to reestablish the conditions equating the marginal utility of spending on private and public goods by fully offsetting the government's transfers to charity. When m < N , the taxation of people who do not contribute voluntarily increases the total funds available to the charity as in Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) . The total increase in G is smaller than the increase in the involuntary contributions of selfish individuals (N − m)t, however. The reason is that altruists respond by curtailing their own contributions by even more than the tax that is levied on them.
As shown in (7), altruists also reduce their own contribution g when the number of altruists m is higher. As far as an altruistic individual i is concerned, the only effect of adding additional altruists is to increase G −i . Equation (6) then implies that g i falls. As emphasized by Sugden (1982) 
where E i is the operator that takes expectations based on i's information. The linearity of D i in E i (m − 1) turns out to be very convenient in the case of multiple types studied below.
In addition, the utility of each member of A depends on the payoffs of the other members.
Letting the parameter a capture the intensity of this altruism for other altruists, we have
Since altruists expect other altruists to be identical, altruist i each expects all others to have the same private consumption x j and the same expectation regarding (m−1), E j (m−1).
Using (3), (9) in (10), the utility of altruist i is thus
I focus on symmetric rational expectations equilibria at which each individual i sets g i optimally while having correct beliefs about G, t, N , and g, the equilibrium contributions 9 of other altruists. 11 As a result, any altruist i's belief concerning m satisfies
By the same token, i's expectation of E j (m − 1) when j is any altruist different from i is
This differs from E i (m − 1) because i realizes that he can affect G −j by changing g i . Using
(12) and (13) in (11), the utility of altruist i conditional on G −i is
Using (1) to substitute for x i in this equation, the first order condition for an optimal (interior) level of g i is
As required by the second order condition, the derivative of this equation with respect to g i is negative. Its derivative with respect to G −i is
In the standard case considered in the previous section, the parameters a and w are zero, so this expression is negative. It then follows that, as discussed above, g i falls when G −i rises. At the opposite extreme, when a and w are positive while v is negligible, so that the predominant source of donations is the desire to raise the self-esteem of people who share one's altruism, (16) is positive so that g i rises with G −i . An increase in G −i signals that there are more members of A so that increases in g i raise the self-esteem of more people.
To understand in more detail the conditions under which an increase in G −i raises g i , it is worth computing the symmetric equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, each individual contribution g i must equal the common belief about the contributions of others g. Therefore,
. Using this in (15), this equilibrium satisfies
This equilibrium condition simplifies further when t = 0. Equation (17) implies that, in this case.
As in the standard analysis discussed earlier, increases in m, the number of contributors to public goods, lower individual contributions when w = 0. This is true even if a > 0 so that an increase in other's donations signals to all altruists that they should obtain a larger vicarious utility gain from an increase in G. Even with a > 0, the main effect of an increase in m is to raise G and lower the marginal utility of donating.
The result that g falls when m rises can be overturned if in addition to a being positive, w is large relative to v. Since g is strictly increasing in ψ and depends on m only through ψ, what is required for this is that dψ/dm be positive. Therefore, g rises with m if and only if
Notice that this condition turns out to be easier to meet as m and a grow. A reduction in a implies that altruists care less about the self-esteem of other altruists, so that it pushes in the same direction as a reduction in w. An increase in m, by contrast, raises the number of people whose self-esteem is affected by increasing g i and thus acts in a way that is similar to an increase in w. The role of m in this model might seem problematic because (18) implies that, as m rises without bound, g becomes arbitrarily close to I so that people give almost all their income to charity. It is important to stress, however, that the analysis has been conducted for a fixed population N , and m cannot be larger than this. Moreover, the parameter w may well depend on N itself. If, for example, self-esteem depends on the fraction of individuals that share one's views rather than on their absolute number, w would be inversely proportional to N . In that case, ψ would not rise with the total population N , though it would still be increasing in m for given N if (19) were satisfied.
Interestingly, condition (19) also ensures that g i is increasing in G −i . To see this, it suffices to notice that, when t = 0, the expression in (16) equals 1/g 2 times the leftmost expression (19). Since a positive value of the expression in (16) leads g i to be increasing in G −i , the conclusion follows.
Three different field experiments suggest that increases in m and G −i raise g i . The most direct evidence is in Frey and Meier (2004) who selectively provided information to students in Zurich about past contributions. When the data they provided suggested that past contributions had been widespread, individual were more likely to contribute than when they provided no such data. The contribution rate fell further when they provided information suggesting that past participation was low. Similarly, List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) show that contributions rise when more "seed money" is available for the purchase of a university computer. Finally, Shang and Croson (2009) manipulate how public radio volunteers respond to incoming calls wishing to make a donation. They find that these donors make larger contributions if they are told that someone else has given more.
This observed complementarity between donations and expectations of other's donations contradicts the standard model described earlier (which implies that these variables are substitutes). 12 It also contradicts the version of Andreoni's (1990) "warm glow" model where the benefits of donations are "purely egoistic" in that individuals derive utility only from their own donations and not from G. The reason is that, in this case, G −i should exert no influence on g i . As demonstrated by Romano and Yildirim (2001) , a "mixed" model where i's utility depends on both his own donation g i and on total donations G need no be inconsistent with a positive response of g i to G −i . What is necessary for this to be the case, however, is that second partial derivatives satisfy certain properties. In the case where the utility function is separable in private goods, what is needed is that the derivative of utility with respect to g i (the "warm glow effect") be larger when total donations are higher. It is not immediately apparent when utility functions should be expected to have this property, however, so that the current paper can be seen as an attempt to provide a psychological foundation for this feature.
I now proceed to study the extent to which an increase in taxes t that is matched by increased government expenditures on G leads to declines in individual contributions. Differentiating the equilibrium condition (17), we have
Both −dF/dt and −dF/dg are positive. When w = 0, so that self-esteem considerations are absent, the former is strictly larger than the latter because N exceeds m. Thus a one dollar increase in taxes leads contributors to lower their contributions by more than one dollar. This result also obtained when both a and w were zero, so this shows that altruism among members of A is not sufficient to overturn this result. If, however, w and a are both positive, it becomes possible for dF/dg to exceed dF/dt so that dg/dt is smaller than one in absolute value.
For given w, a and n, the absolute value of dg/dt shrinks together with v. For illustrative purposes it is thus useful to study the limit where v is negligible. At that point, (17) simplifies so that the equilibrium value of g is given by
A one dollar increase in t thus has the same effect on the contributions of members of A as a one dollar reduction in I. If individuals contributions rise by 2 to 4 cents with a one dollar increase in income, this reduction in contributions is negligible. Total crowding out is smaller still since a one dollar increase in taxes raises total revenue by N dollars of which only m * dg/dI are crowded out. If the fraction of contributors m/N is 70 percent, total crowding out is between 1.5 and 3 cents per dollar.
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A rich empirical literature has sought to determine the extent to which government transfers to charities crowd out private donations. The estimates range widely, though relatively few studies find the nearly complete crowd out predicted by the model when w is set to zero. What we just established is that much lower levels of crowding out, even the negligible crowd-out found by Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) , can be rationalized if one is willing to reduce v and increase w. Instead of being given by (3), the material payoffs of an altruist of type τ are now given
A model with two types
by
Similarly, equation (9) for total individualistic payoffs is replaced by
so that the self-esteem of an altruist of type τ can depend differentially on their expectations of the number of altruists of type H and the number of altruists of type L. Lastly, equation (10) for overall utility is replaced by
14 so that an altruist of type τ can care differentially for altruists of types H and L.
The maximization of U τ i can be simplified somewhat by noting that individual i expects all the altruists of the same type to choose the same level of x, x τ j . Using (22), and (23) in (24), we obtain 
In the equilibria I consider, individuals pick g 
Equilibria with contributions to distinct charities
At a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium in which both g H and g L are positive, these expressions must equal zero while g τ i must equal to g τ and G τ must equals g τ m τ . Therefore,
Notice that, at a separating equilibrium with g τ > 0 the equations in (27) allow altruists to infer m τ without error. The conditions in (28) are necessary for a such an equilibrium, and turn out to be easily met: Proof. For fixed g ω > 0, the limit of the left hand side of (28) when g τ goes to zero from above is plus infinity while the limit when it goes to I τ from below is minus infinity. There is thus a zero between 0 and I τ for every positive g ω .
This establishes that one can find a pair of values g L and g H that satisfy these necessary conditions. For this pair to be an actual equilibrium, altruists of type τ must not wish to deviate by contributing to the charity that receives funds from altruists of type ω where
Since (28) 
This leads to two conclusions:
implies that a separating equilibrium exists only if g L ≥ g H . On the other hand, inspection of (28) In calculating these expectations, I neglect integer constraints and suppose that every First, suppose that, as in Figure 1 , 
. Since all these combinations are equally likely, Since these combinations of m are all equally likely, the posterior distribution of m H is uniform between (G
Figure 2 shows that altruists reach analogous inferences when
Using (31) 
H is smaller than both these critical values, Figure   1 applies, while Figure 3 is relevant when it is larger than both. If 
The analysis for an altruist of type H is quite similar, though not identical. One obvious difference is that, if the equilibrium value of g H differs from that of g L , the equilibrium value 
The equilibrium depends, once again, on the effect of changes in individual contributions on the perceived number of altruists. Regardless of whether an individual i is of type L or H, an increase in his own contribution g i by one dollar raises the G τ j of all other agents by one dollar. At the boundary values of (32) and (33), the change in the perceived values of m H and m L is different for altruists of the two types. However, the effect is the same in the interior of these regions. To see this, differentiate (32) and (33), which yields
for τ and ω equal to H or L, where j must differ from i when ω = τ .
One notable aspect of (34) This assumption about beliefs corresponds to the actual effect of individual donations under two conditions. The first is that individual's income is negligible relative to G, which requires that the N 's be large. This implies that the region in which G τ −j finds itself within (34) is not affected by i's contribution. The second is individual donations are necessarily treated as being given to the indistinguishable set of charities; the individual is unable to require that his donations be directed at a "different" one.
Using the first line of (32), (33), and (34) in (26), an altruist's gains from increasing his contributions slightly are 
where
At this equilibrium,
Proof. Because assumption A holds and the optimization problem of individuals satisfies the second order conditions, an equilibrium requires only that individuals not gain anything from changing their donations slightly. If g L were exogenous, one could thus obtain the equilibrium level of g H by taking (36) for τ = H and equating it to zero after substituting
For altruists of type L to find it optimal to set g L i equals to r times this value of g H when other altruists of type L are giving rg H , it must be the case that the expression in (36) for τ = L is zero at this point. This requires that
which is satisfied when I L satisfies (37).
The income ratio I L /I H that solves (37) for r = 0 leads to an equilibrium in which altruists of type L are indifferent between keeping their contributions at zero and increasing them slightly. This income ration turns out to play an important role. In particular, (26) for τ = L are zero when (39) holds as an equality. Equation (26) In the standard public goods case the a's or the w's are zero, so that condition (39) is valid As the ratio g L /g H is raised above zero, it goes from being smaller than both (
Proposition 5. Supposing Assumption A holds, if
to being greater than these terms. When this ratio is larger than both, we find ourselves in the case described in the last line of (34). As discussed above,
whether intermediate values of g L /g H lead to the second or third line of (34) depends on Agent's expectations then obey the second lines of (32), (33), and (34). Using these expectations in (26) we obtain the private gains from increasing these contributions slightly.
These are
Using the same arguments used to prove Proposition 4, we then have:
Supposing Assumption A holds, an equilibrium with g L /g H = r exists as long as r 0 < r < r 1 and
At this equilibrium,
I now demonstrate that a pooling equilibrium of the kind described in Proposition 6 can exist even when there also exists an equilibrium in which one of the two types does not contribute to charity. To do this, it is necessary to show that I L /I H can satisfy (41) for an r between r 0 and r 1 while also satisfying (39). These equations would be incompatible if and w LL exceeds w LH . The second is that, if r is lower than one, the cost of signaling that there is an additional altruist in the population can be lower when r exceeds r 0 . This cost equals (1/2g H )(1 + 1/r) whereas it equals 1/g H when r is smaller than r 0 (including when r = 0).
To illustrate the importance of these forces, I now focus on a special case in which every altruist cares about every other altruist equally. We then have: Proof. Using the assumed properties of the a's, the w's and the v's, condition (39) becomes
where note is taken that R depends on N L . Using the properties of a, w and v in the 27 definitions of ψ τ M given in Proposition 6, we obtain
Now consider the variable θ(r) given by
The limit of θ(r) as r goes to zero is zero while its limit as r becomes unboundedly large is infinite. Thus, r's can be found such that θ(r) < R. At these r's, there is an equilibrium with an I L /I H satisfying (39) and (41). For given N L , the resulting r might be below r 0 , however. Raising N L lowers r 0 but also lowers R, thereby requiring yet another reduction in r. What can be shown, however, is that when N L is large, the I L /I H that is consistent with r 0 is below R. To see this, let r = r 0 , which yields
The limit of ψ
is zero. The limit of θ(r 0 )/R is thus smaller than one as long as awm H < 2. For an r near this r 0 to be an equilibrium for an I L /I H below R, it must also be the case that this r 0 is below r 1 . For any r 0 , this can be achieved by raising N H . To complete the analysis, I now briefly consider the case where g L /g H is greater than the
This maximum can be expected to be small if N L is large relative to N H . This the case because, across realizations of the m's, the mean value of the numerators of both these expressions is N H /2 while that of the denominators is near N L /2. It follows that the fourth line of (34) is often relevant even for
Using these expectations in (26) the individual gains from increasing g
The steps used to prove Proposition 4 then also imply that:
where One unappealing aspect of the results in Figure 5 is that the equilibrium levels of g L /g In the context of this model, however, it seems more reasonable to suppose that altruists of type H have a particular affinity for altruists of type H, and analogously for altruists of type L. An example of this sort is considered in Figure 6 . Most parameters, including a τ τ and w τ τ for τ equal to L or H are the same as those for Figure 5 . 
At this equilibrium,
g H = ψ H T (r) 1 + ψ H T (r) I H(
Moving between pooling and separating equilibria
The first question studied in this section is whether, when both kinds of equilibria coexist, equilibria with indistinguishable charities raise more or less total revenue than equilibria with distinct charities. One case where the former clearly raise less is when only one type contributes to the indistinguishable charities. This leads me to consider how easy it is to "escape" from an equilibrium where only one type contributes. Lastly, I discuss reasons why the differentiation among charities might increase without an accompanying increase in donations There is a simple, and extreme, case where equilibria of both types exist while the equilibrium with separate charities raises more revenue. This is the case studied in Proposition 3, where both types care only about the altruism of people of their own type. We then have: Proof. Equation (28) implies that contributions at separating equilibria satisfy
When charities are indistinguishable, (26) implies that the conditions for altruists of type τ not to wish to increase their contributions take the form
For interior equilibria, these have to hold as equalities, and otherwise 
so that it expects its contributions to be the same as in (45).
Since the left hand side is increasing in g τ , both types expect that their g τ would be larger is (45) held.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple: if people gain utility only from signaling to altruists of their own type, contributing to a joint charity is relatively unattractive because some of the signal is "wasted" by giving utility to altruists of the other type.
Even in the case where distinct charities collect more funds, it may not be easy to move from an equilibrium with a single type of charity to one with several. As already seen implicitly in the proof of Proposition 4, this is particularly difficult under assumption A, which guarantees that all contributions are treated as pertaining to a single set of indistinguishable charities. The problem extends, however, to situations where Assumption A is violated so that it is possible for an individual to contribute to a distinct charity. This will occur, in particular, if people who observe a positive contributions to an alternative charity assume that these contributions come form a single individual while, at the same time, their prior distribution of m L assigns zero weight to the possibility that m L = 0.
The posterior distribution of m L is then equal to the prior one. What is interesting about this special case is that the individual who is deviating is conveying his type correctly, as in the suggestion by Cho and Kreps (1987) , and yet the more relevant equilibrium inference, which concerns the total number of altruists of type L, does not change.
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What this suggests is that moving from an equilibrium with a single charity to one with several requires a certain degree of coordination. Charities may achieve this coordination through marketing messages, though how they accomplish this is left for further research.
It is worth noting that, even when charities do manage to separate by appealing to different segments, revenues do not necessarily rise (as they did in the case considered in Proposition 9.
To demonstrate this, I consider a numerical example. only on this middle region, Figure 8 combines the first two panels of Figure 7 to plot total contributions as a function of I L /I H . It also plots the levels of total contributions that, for these income ratios, result from the solution to (28). These are equilibria if agents have access to charities that are distinguishable by type because, at these points, the inequalities (29) and (30) The coexistence of a relatively stagnant level of total donations with an increase in differentiation across charities can be rationalized in another way, and this is with a decline in the concern of altruists of any given type for altruists of the other type. This reduction in inter-group altruism tends to reduce donations for a constant set of charities while, at the same time, it makes increased differentiation possible. To see this in a simple case, focus on the limit where v τ is zero. Equation (28) then implies that, if an equilibrium with distinct charities exists, equilibrium donations are given by
It follows that these donations fall when either a τ ω or w τ ω decline. This is not surprising since a decline in either of these parameters signifies that people care less about the altruism of others and are less concerned about the welfare of others, and these are the forces that I This proposition shows that smooth declines in α, the extent to which altruists care about people of the other type, eventually make it possible for an equilibrium with distinct charities to exist. Thus, reductions in inter-group altruism would lead to growth in the number of distinct charities if, for example, distinct charities were always created when they were sustainable in equilibrium.
Conclusions
This paper has shown that two assumptions grounded in evidence from psychology can help explain some aspects of charitable giving. Most particularly, the combination of letting altruism be larger towards like-minded people and having self-esteem depend on the number of people that agree with oneself is consistent with small reductions in one's own giving in response to larger giving by others. Indeed, there are parameters for which the model predicts that an individual will increase his own giving when others give more. The model is also able to explain why certain charities attract contributions from people with different income levels even if one does not assume that the underlying other regarding preferences differ by income class. In particular, the model does not require poor people to be extremely generous relative to rich people (or rich people to be extremely selfish relative to poor ones) in order to have both make contributions at the same time.
Having said this, it is important to stress that the paper has not set out to explain all known puzzles concerning charitable contributions. As it stands, for example, the model seems unlikely to provide a meaningful account of situations in which people split their charitable contributions among a number of charities. The reason is that, as in models where charitable giving is due exclusively to altruism towards recipients, the model predicts that the marginal utility of giving is independent of the size of the gift. This suggests that people should concentrate their gifts on charities that give the highest marginal utility of giving. If several charities provide this same maximal level, the allocation among them is a matter of indifference.
To provide a more determinate explanation of people who contribute to multiple char-ities, the model would have to be modified. One possibility along these lines is to try to model people's desire to "hedge their bets" when making contributions. To capture this phenomenon, one would have to take into account people's uncertainty regarding charities and people's fear of regretting their contribution. This is consistent with one important aspect of charities, namely that measuring their effectiveness is difficult and, partly for this reason, they find themselves frequently embroiled in scandal. When a scandal erupts, contributors can be expected to regret their contributions. A contributor that spreads his gifts across charities increases the odds of regretting one of his gifts but reduces the size of each potential regret. Aversion to large regrets would thus incline individuals to spreading out their donations. 
